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Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut
内视,同理心,及精神健康的半圆
海因兹、科胡特
195
SUMMARY
纲要
What does my 1959 essay discuss, what was its objective 目标? The answer to this question was spelled out 解释in its title. It was to be 'An examination of the relationship between mode of observation 观察 and theory'. I did not write about empathy as a psychic activity. I did not write about empathy as associated with any specific 明确emotion 情感 such as, in particular, compassion同情 or affection 感情. It may be motivated 引发动机 by, and used in the service of, hostile-destructive 敌意及毁灭 aims. I did not write about empathy as associated with intuition 直觉.
我1959年的论文讨论什么?它的目标是什么?这个问题的回答从它的标题可获得解释:这篇论文是要「检视观察模式与理论的关系」。我没有写到同理心作为心灵的活动。我没有写到同理心,作为跟任何明确情感的联想,譬如,特别是同情心或情感。同理心的激发及使用,在于服侍敌意--毁灭的目标。我并没有写到同理心,作为跟直觉的联想。
As is the case with extrospection , it may, occasionally, be used seemingly intuitively 直觉by experts: that is, via 经由mental processes 过度of observation that identify 辨认complex 复杂configurations 形态pre-consciously and at great speed. But mostly, certainly in psychoanalysis, empathy is used non-intuitively 非直觉, ploddingly 孜孜工作, if you wish, by trial and error.尝试与错误 I did not write about empathy as being always correct and accurate 正确.
如同在外视的情况,有时它似乎被专家直觉地使用,也就是,经观察到精神过程,前意识地而且快速地辨认复杂的形态。但是大部分来说,确实就是在精神分析学,同理心是非直觉地,孜孜不倦地,尝试与错误地被使用。我并没有书写同理心,当著总是正确无误。
As is the case with extrospection and external 外在reality, introspection and empathy may misperceive 错误 the psychic reality we scrutinize 审查(already on the level of data collection), either because we are guided by erroneous错误 expectations, by misleading theories that distort 扭曲our perception, or because we are not sufficiently充分 conscientious用心 and rigorous严格 in immersing沉浸于 ourselves for protracted延长 periods in the field of our observation观察. We must, in other words, be able to tolerate 容忍uncertainty and to postpone 拖延our closures. 封闭
就外视及外在的现实的情况而言,内视及同理心可能会错误地感受我们审查的心灵的现实(已经是在资料收集的层次),要就是我们被错误的期望,误导的理论所引导,这些理论扭曲我们的感觉。要不就是因为我们没有充分地用心及严谨,当我们自己沉浸于我们观察领域过分长久。换句话说,我们必须能够容忍不确定,并拖延我们心灵的封闭。
But now, while I could, of course, go on and enlarge扩大 the list of the areas that I did not address处理 in my original essay, I will turn from the negative 负面to the positive正面 , from telling you what I did not say in 1959 to what, in fact, I said. I will begin with a general statement 陈述. There are, to speak descriptively 描述第 and implying no value judgment whatever, two roads in science. Let me call them the high road and the low road in science. The low road is the empirical 试验stance态度的data 资料collection and experience-near theory vis-a-vis 面对面 the field that is investigated.
但是现在,我当然能够继续并且扩大,我原先论文没有处理的这些地区的名单。我将从负面到正面,从告诉您们在1959年我没有说的部分,到事实上我说出的部分。我将会以一般性的陈述开始。描述地,而且根本不含价值判断地说,科学有两条道路。让我称它们为科学的高端道路跟低端道路。低端道路是试验性态度资料收集,及邻近经验理论,跟被研究的领域面面相觑。
The high road is the epistemological 认识stance 态度. It examines the relationship between the data already collected and, especially, the relationship between the experience-near theories that have already been formulated 说明. On the basis of these cognitive 认知 manoeuvres 策略 , it formulates 说明a broad and comprehensive 全面的 experience-distant 遥远经验theory. I believe that science needs to proceed 继续on both of these roads. I rebel against 反叛 a purely speculative 推测的stance 态度when theory is built upon theory and the observation of the field is neglected 忽略.
高端道路上认识论的态度。它检视已经收集的资料之间的关系,特别是已经被说明的邻近经验理论之间的关系。根据这些认知策略的基础,它说明一个宽广而全面性的远距经验理论。我相信,科学需要继续沿着这两条道路前进。我反抗的是一种纯粹推测的态度,以理论建立在理论之上,而对于领域的观察则是被忽略。
But I also know that every science must be aware of the experience-distant theories that provide the framework for its experience-near investigations and that it must, from time to time, re-examine the experience-distant theories it has espoused 拥护even those that seem so basic to its outlook 外观that they are hardly considered to be theories anymore. Luckily, there is a voice in us that will tell us, however dimly we may perceive it at first, and however reluctant 不愿意we may be to acknowledge承认 its message, that the time has come for us to question our basic theories. This voice will, in general, speak to us after we have been, persistently 持续地and increasingly, uncomfortable with the pragmatic 实用的results that we have been obtaining 获得. It is then that we should move from the low road of pragmatism 实用主义to the high road of epistemology 认识论only to return to the first in order to test the new theoretical vantage 最佳的 point, that we may now have adopted 採用.
但是我也知道,每个科学必须知道远距经验的理论。这种理论提供架构给它的邻近经验的研究,有时它必须重新检视它曾经拥护的远距经验,甚至是那些对它的外观似乎如此基本的,以致于几乎不再被认为是理论。幸运地,我们内心有一个声音会告诉我们,无论起初我们只是模糊地感觉到它,无论我们多么不愿意承认它的讯息,我们质问我们基本理论的时间已经来到。一般来说,这个声音会跟我们说,在我们持续而且逐渐地,对于我们一直获得的实用结果,感觉不自在。就在那时,我们应该从实用主义的低端道路,转移到认识论的高端道路。结果却是回到低端道路,为了要测试新的理论最佳面相点,那是我们可能已经採用的。
In order to prevent confusion let me stress 强调here that during the first half of today's presentation I will be primarily talking about empathy in the context 内容 in which I had used it in my 1959 paper and in which I have continued to use it, until very recently, almost entirely (for exceptions cf. Kohut, 1973a), (1973b). I will, in other words, be talking about empathy in an epistemological 认识论context. In this context, as should go without saying, empathy is a value-neutral 价值中立mode of observation; a mode of observation attuned适合于 to the inner life of man, just as extrospection 外观is a mode of observation attuned to the external 外在的world.
为了阻挡混淆,让我在此强调,在今天演讲的前面一半,我将首先讨论内容的同理心部分。这是在1959年的论文我曾经用过。后来我继续使用它。直到最近,我几乎是全部使用它。(1973a年及1973b 那两篇例外)。换句话说,我将会从认识论的内容,来讨论同理心。在这个内容里,自不待言的是,同理心是一种价值中立的观察模式,一种适合于人的内在生命的观察模式。正如外视是一种观察模式,适合于外在模式。
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It is true, however, that, as I mentioned earlier, empathy can and should also be examined and evaluated 评估in an empirical 试验性地 context as a mental 精神的activity, whether employed 运用in everyday life or in scientific pursuits 追求. And I have indeed, very recently, begun to look upon empathy from this point of view, complex 复杂but still manageable 可处理 undertaking 从事, if one keeps in mind that even with regard to关于 this 'low road', that is, with regard to this experience-near approach, we must differentiate区别 between two levels: (a) empathy as an information-gathering activity, and (b) empathy as a powerful emotional 情感的bond 契合between people. Before addressing 处理myself, as I did in 1959, to the role of empathy in the most experience-distant, epistemological 认识论sense, let me therefore briefly consider the specifics 明确 of the examination of empathy in these latter two more experience-near contexts 内容.
可是,确实的,如同我早先提到,同理心能够而且应该在试验性地内容被检视及评估,,作为一种精神的活动,无论是被运用在日常的生活,或是在从事科学的追求。的确在最近,我曾经开始从这个观点看待同理心。这是复杂但是还是可以掌控的从事,假如我们心里记住,即使关于这个「低端道路」,也就是说,关于邻近经验的方法,我们必须区别两个层次:其一,同理心作为一种收集资讯的活动;其二,同理心作为一种人际之间的强烈的情感默契。如同1959年,我从最远距经验的认识论的意义,先处理同理心扮演的角色。因此让我简短地考虑到对于同理心的检视的明确细节,在这两个更加邻近经验的内容里。
As an information-collecting, data-gathering 收集资料 activity, empathy, as I have stressed 强调many times since 1971, can be right or wrong, in the service of compassion同情 or hostility 敌意, pursued 追求slowly and ploddingly 孜孜不倦or 'intuitively'直觉, that is, at great speed. In this sense empathy is never by itself supportive 支持or therapeutic 治疗. It is, however, a necessary precondition先决条件 to being successfully supportive 支持 and therapeutic 治疗. In other words, even if a mother's empathy is correct and accurate 正确, even if her aims are affectionate 情感, it is not her empathy that satisfies her child's selfobject needs. Her actions, her responses 回应to the child will do this. In order, however, to achieve their end properly, these actions and responses have to be guided by correct and accurate 正确empathy. Empathy is thus a precondition 先决条件for a mother's appropriate 适当functioning 功用as the child's selfobject, 自我客体 it informs parental selfobject function vis-a-vis 面对面the child, but it is not, by itself, the selfobject function 功用that is needed by the child.
作为收集资讯,收集资料的活动,如同我自从19971年曾经强调好几次,无论对错,同理心能够服侍同情或敌意,缓慢而孜孜不倦,或「直觉地」追求,换句话说,快速地追求。以这个意义,同理心本身从来不是支持或是治疗。可是,对于要成功地支持及治疗,它是一个先决条件。换句话说,即使母亲的同理心是正确无误,即使她的目标是情感,满足她的小孩自身客体的需要,并不是同理心。她对于小孩的行动与回应,将可以满足这个需要。可是,为了适当地达成它们的目标,这些行动与回应必须由正确无误的同理心引导。同理心因此是母亲适当充当小孩的自身客体功用的先决条件,它跟小孩当面告知父母亲的自身客体的功用。它本身并不是小孩需要的自身客体的功用。
I wish that I could stop my discussion of empathy as a concrete 具体的force in human life at this point without having to make one further step which appears to contradict 矛盾everything that I have said so far, and which exposes me to the suspicion 怀疑of abandoning放弃 scientific sobriety 清醒and of entering the land of mysticism 神秘主义or of sentimentality 感伤性. I assure 告诉you that I would like to avoid making this step and that it is not the absence of scientific rigour 精力but submission 顺服 to it that forces me to tell you that even though everything I have said up to now remains fully valid有效 so long as we evaluate评估 empathy as an instrument 工具of observation and as an informer of supportive 支持, therapeutic 治疗and psychoanalytic action (in therapeutic analysis the action is called interpretation 解释), I must now, unfortunately, add that empathy per se, the mere presence of empathy, has also a beneficial 有利, in a broad sense, a therapeutic 治疗effect both in the clinical setting 背景and in human life, in general.
我但愿,我能够在这个时候停止我对于同理心的讨论,当著述人类生命的具体力量,而不必须再跨前一步,把我迄今所说的一切,似乎弄得互相牴触。向前一步会将我承受这种怀疑:我是在放弃科学的清晰态度,并且进入神秘主义或情感作用的领域。我告诉你们,我真想要避免跨出这一步。不是由于欠缺科学的精神,而是遵照科学的精神,我不得不告诉大家:即使我迄今所说的一切,始终充分有效,只要我们评估同理心,作为一种观察的工具,及作为支持,治疗及精神分析的行动(在治疗的精神分析,这个行动被称为解释)。不幸地,我现在必须补充一句:同理心本身,仅是同理心的存在,广义来说,就已经有治疗的效果,在临床的背景及一般的人际相处。
雄伯译
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